Withholding Tax Rates on Dividends: Symmetries vs. Asymmetries in Double Tax Treaties by Petkova, Kunka
 WU International Taxation Research Paper Series 
No. 2020 - 02 
 
Withholding Tax Rates on Dividends: Sym-
metries vs. Asymmetries in Double Tax 
Treaties 
  
Kunka Petkova 
Editors: 
Eva Eberhartinger, Michael Lang, Rupert Sausgruber and Martin Zagler (Vienna University of 
Economics and Business), and Erich Kirchler (University of Vienna) 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3538234
	Withholding Tax Rates on Dividends: 
Symmetries vs. Asymmetries in Double 
Tax Treaties  
by 
Kunka Petkova*# 
(Vienna University of Economics and Business) 
 
 
This version, 14 February 2020 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Out of all double tax treaties (DTTs) in force in 2012, around 41% are symmetric and 
59% are asymmetric, i.e., they prescribe different dividend withholding tax rates 
(WTRs) depending on the foreign investor’s ownership fraction. The paper 
investigates the reasons for this phenomenon, namely why some countries in their 
DTTs prefer homogenous withholding tax rates over separate rates for participation 
and portfolio dividends. In a theoretical model, I demonstrate why home countries 
may have an interest in a high withholding tax rate in the host country, even though 
they do not receive the revenue from this tax. Further, I find confirming evidence that 
a reason for having asymmetric withholding tax rates on dividends is an existing 
spatial dependence on the rates of the countries’ peers that may be a driving factor 
for setting asymmetric rates. Finally, I confirm that the spread itself (i.e., the 
difference between the portfolio and participation dividends negotiated in the tax 
treaty) is also affected by the peer countries. 
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1 Introduction 
Double taxation or the levying of tax by two jurisdictions on the same declared 
income, asset or transaction is not a recent problem. Even though residence 
countries usually provide some method of double tax relief in attempt to prevent 
double taxation unilaterally, for instance, by giving the investors a credit for tax 
paid abroad or by exempting foreign-source income from domestic tax, these 
attempts are mostly imperfect. Therefore, with the expansion of transportation 
and the fast-growing rates of capital transactions, double tax treaties have 
started to emerge. Their main role is to set out rules to avoid double taxation.  
Prior literature on double tax treaties (DTTs) primarily focuses on their effects 
on foreign direct investment (FDI) or on the formation side of DTTs (see Van’t 
Riet and Lejour 2018; Hong 2018; Chisik and Davies 2004). Accounting for the 
opportunities for treaty shopping, Petkova et al. (2019) show that relevant tax 
treaties – which reduce repatriation taxes on dividends both over domestic law 
and the entire existing treaty network – will increase FDI by about 18%. Ligthart 
et al. (2011) use a gravity model to conclude that countries sign DTTs mainly to 
reduce international double taxation and, to a lesser extent, to provide a legal 
instrument for the exchange of information in tax matters. Despite these 
contributions, certain parts of the international tax treaty policy still remain 
unexplored. In this paper, I concentrate on the results for withholding tax rates 
(WTRs), in particular, at those for dividends.   
Generally, cross-border portfolio investments trigger withholding taxes in the 
source countries, i.e. the countries in which the funds are invested. Applying 
withholding taxes may be justified by the fact that foreign investors would 
otherwise benefit from the infrastructure of the source country without 
contributing enough to it by just paying the corporate income taxes (Taxology 
2018). Therefore, WTRs are often levied to ensure the collection of taxes, 
especially in situations in which the income would possibly escape taxation 
(Willis 1963). Also, withholding taxes are a simple way of administering taxes, in 
particular, because non-residents are less available to the tax authorities than 
residents. The most common withholding tax rates are those on dividends, 
interest and royalties. They are called withholding taxes because, even though 
the foreign investor is the taxpayer, they are withheld from the dividends or 
interest paid by the company in which the foreign investor has invested and 
remitted to the source country’s tax administration (Taxology 2018). In other 
words, they are to be paid to the tax administration by the payer rather than the 
recipient.  
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When it comes to dividends, there is an important distinction as often one of 
two possible rates in the form of portfolio and participation dividends may apply. 
In particular, out of all double tax treaties in force in 2012, around 41% are 
symmetric and 59% are asymmetric, i.e., they prescribe different dividend 
withholding tax rates depending on the foreign investor’s ownership fraction. 
Often, companies owning less than a specified percentage of shares in a foreign 
company are granted only a limited reduction in the standard rate of withholding 
tax. Such shareholders are known as portfolio shareholders (Deloitte 
International Tax Source 2020). Shareholders owning more than the prescribed 
limit are often granted a more generous reduction or even elimination of 
withholding tax, and are labelled significant shareholders.  
To my knowledge, this is the first, and so far only, paper dealing with this 
phenomenon, namely why some countries in their double tax conventions prefer 
homogenous withholding tax rates over separate rates for participation and 
portfolio dividends. Such differentiation is typically absent under national law. 
This paper investigates the reasons for the asymmetry in the withholding tax 
rates in DTTs. One possible explanation for the higher withholding tax rate on 
portfolio dividends is that tax avoidance in the case of portfolio dividends is more 
likely. In a theoretical model presented in Section 4.1, I demonstrate why home 
countries may have an interest in a high withholding tax rate in the host country, 
even though they do not receive the tax revenue from this tax. This may happen 
since the withholding tax rate abroad helps them to decrease domestic tax 
avoidance and increase thereby the tax revenue in the home country. In the 
same Section 4.1, I test this hypothesis with the existent data and present 
confirming evidence.  
Further, one hypothesis for having asymmetric withholding tax rates on 
dividends is an existing spatial dependence on the rates of the countries’ peers 
that may be a driving factor for setting split rates. I confirm this hypothesis in 
Section 4.2.  
In the remainder of the paper, I provide more information on the dataset and 
some summary statistics in Section 2. In Section 3, I look at the development of 
the withholding tax rates on dividends and their international tax competition over 
time. Section 4 investigates possible reasons for the differentiation between the 
withholding tax rates and the hypotheses are tested empirically. Finally, Section 
5 concludes.   
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2 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
The dataset covers 131 countries and 2470 double tax treaties signed between 
1950 and 2012 (see Figure 1). This implies that of all possible country pairs in 
the sample, 29% actually have a double tax treaty in force in 2012. Further, the 
treaty network might be subject to changes, such as effective new treaties in 
place, termination of treaties and changes due to subsequent protocols. 
Therefore, I take all of those into account and update the dataset accordingly.  
 
Figure	1:	Number	of	Treaties	and	Treaty	Types	over	the	Years	
	
	
Note	that	double	tax	treaties	are	counted	twice,	as	withholding	tax	rates	applied	from	country	A	to	country	B	
may	be	different	than	the	tax	rates	applied	from	country	B	to	country	A,	and	may	therefore	be	asymmetric.	
Table 1 summarizes the possible constellations for the withholding tax rates on 
dividends of the treaty partners and their corresponding number in the sample. 
The first one (Column 1: Uniform rates) consists of uniform and equal rates for 
both countries. This means that the two treaty partners have only one withholding 
tax rate on dividends and it is the same in both directions (see 1.1). A further 
option is that each of the two treaty partners has again only one withholding tax 
rate on dividends but this one is not the same in both directions (see 1.2). What 
is more, countries might have split rates on dividends. Four scenarios are 
possible: they have equal rates on both dividend types (see 2.1); they have equal 
rates only on the lower rate on participation dividends (see 2.2); they have equal 
rates only on the higher rate on portfolio dividends (see 2.3); or they do not have 
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any equal rates (see 2.4). Finally, it is possible that only one of the treaty partners 
has split rates in the double tax treaty. Here, three further subcases are feasible 
(see 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3).1 Overall, it can be seen from Table 1 that out of all double 
tax treaties in the sample 41% are symmetric (1.1 and 1.2 together) and 59% 
are asymmetric (2.1), whose development can be seen in Figure 1. In the 
remainder of the paper, I will look at those cases without any further 
differentiation.  
Table	1:	Constellations	for	the	Withholding	Tax	Rates	on	Dividends	in	the	Double	Tax	
Treaties	in	2012	
1.	Uniform	rates	 2.	Split	rates	both	countries	 3.	Split	rates	one	country	
1.1.	Equal	rates:	1.739		
(a	a)	(a	a)	
2.1.	Equal	rates	both	rates:	
2.692		
(a	b)	(a	b)		
3.1.	Uniform	rate	only	in	one	
country	equals	participation	
rate	in	the	other:	20		
(a	a)	(a	b)		
2.2.		Equal	rates	only	
participation:	6		
(a	b)	(a	c)		
3.2.	Uniform	rate	only	in	one	
country	equals	portfolio	rate	
in	the	other:	6	
(a	a)	(b	a)		
1.2.	Different	rates:	
136		
(a	a)	(b	b)	with	a≠b	 2.3.	Equal	rates	only	portfolio:	26		(a	b)	(c	b)		 3.3.	No	equal	rates:	51		(a	a)	(b	c)		
2.4.	No	equal	rates:	0		
(a	b)	(c	d)		
Note	 that	 the	 first	 bracket	 (portfolio,	 participation)	 represents	 the	 two	 withholding	 tax	 rates	 on	
dividends	of	 the	 first	 treaty	partner	 that	 could	be	equal	or	different	 from	each	other.	 The	second	
bracket	 depicts	 correspondingly	 the	 two	withholding	 tax	 rates	 on	 dividends	 of	 the	 second	 treaty	
partner	that	could	again	be	equal	or	different	from	each	other.		
3 Withholding Tax Rates on Dividends and 
International Tax Competition   
Over the last decades, barriers to capital movement have become significantly 
lower. As a result of this, capital is expected to move where taxes are lowest. 
Standard contributions to the tax competition literature predict that the increased 
capital mobility will tend to erase sourced-based taxes on mobile capital. Most 
empirical studies focus on the corporate business tax as an important source-
based tax on capital. Indeed, statutory corporate tax rates in developed countries 
have fallen substantially over the last two decades. The average rate among 
OECD countries in the early 1980s was nearly 50% (OECD Tax Database) and 
by 2001 it had fallen to under 35%. Further, average statutory corporate tax rates 
around the world have declined from 32.2 percent in 2000 to 24.7 percent in 
2016 (Hannon 2017). Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2008) find evidence 
                                                
1	Tables 1A and 1B in the appendix look at the development over time by depicting the same constellations 
for the withholding tax rates for 2005 and 1980. 	
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that individual countries cut their own corporate tax rate as a reaction to cuts in 
the average tax rates in other countries.  
However, the corporate income tax is not the only source-based tax on capital 
- source-based taxes are also applied in the form of withholding taxes on 
dividends. The purpose of this section of the paper is to fill a gap in the literature 
by asking why and to what extent tax rates of cross-border flows such as 
dividends have survived over the years. With some qualifications applying, the 
international tax competition models would predict zero, or at least declining 
rates.  
The current section presents the development of the average withholding tax 
rates on participation and portfolio dividends over time. For the purpose of this 
exercise, I look at the existing country pairs that had a double tax treaty in 1980 
and keep them fixed, so that I can observe all changes that happened between 
1980 and 2012.2 The reason for choosing 1980 as the starting year is the fact 
that the international tax competition3 intensified thereafter and more than 30% 
of the signed double tax treaties were already in force. The changes in the 
averages of the withholding tax rates on dividends may be driven by a new 
effective double tax treaty signed between the country pair members, by a 
termination of the existing treaty or by changes via subsequent protocols and 
subsequent treaties with increases or decreases in the corresponding tax rates. 
Figures 2A and 2B depict this development, and Figure 3 shows the 
development of the average spread between WTRs on portfolio and participation 
dividends after 1980.  
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
                                                
2 This approach has been applied to Figures 2A, 2B and 3.  
3 According to Gordon (1992), in the mid-1980’s, the US acted as if it were a Stackelberg leader by setting 
its corporate tax rate high, knowing that it would be in the interest of the other countries to match its rate. 
As the US economic dominance declined and with this also the role as a Stackelberg leader, the pressure 
for lower corporate tax rates may have increased.	
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Figure	2A.	Average	WTRs	on	Participation	Dividends	if	Directed	Country	Pair	Existed	1980	
	
	
	
	
Figure	2B.	Average	WTRs	on	Portfolio	Dividends	if	Directed	Country	Pair	Existed	1980	
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Figure	3.	Development	of	the	Average	Spread	between	WTRs	on	Portfolio	and	
Participation	Dividends	over	Time	if	Directed	Country	Pair	Existed	1980	
	
	
Interestingly, the trends differ for the WTR on participation and portfolio 
dividends. While in the case of participation dividends a downward trend after 
1990 may be observed, portfolio dividends are characterized by an upward trend 
in the years before mid-1990 and remain relatively stable after that. Since the 
early 1980s, tax treaty WTRs on portfolio dividends for the directed country pairs 
that existed in the year 1980 have on average increased by about 5.5 percent 
(or 0.7 percentage points), while the average rate on participating dividends has 
fallen almost by 19.5 percent (or 2 percentage points) until 2012. If the 
development is due to competitive forces, then this will suggest that the 
international tax competition is stronger when it comes to participation dividends. 
There are a few possible explanations for the differences in the international tax 
competition in the withholding tax rates on participation and portfolio dividends. 
They are presented in Sections 3.1 to 3.3.  
When it comes to the spread between the withholding tax rates on portfolio 
and participation dividends, Figure 3 shows that the average spread increased 
over time and almost doubled in the period between 1980 and 2012, which is in 
line with the development presented in Figures 2A and 2B. Some countries that 
previously did not differentiate between the two types of WTRs introduced 
different rates for portfolio and participation dividends.  
Finally, Figures 4A and 4B show the change in the average withholding tax 
rates on participation and portfolio dividends for the same period. However, 
unlike in the previous figures, here the unbalanced average among all double 
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tax treaties (and not only those of the existing country pairs in 1980) in the 
particular year is presented. What can be seen is that participation dividends are 
again characterized by a more dynamic development than the one of portfolio 
dividends and face a steeper decrease after 1990. In the case of portfolio 
dividends, there is also a decrease in the average rates over time, despite being 
very small. Nevertheless, the results in Figure 4 may be due to a possible 
composition effect, as many new treaties have been signed over the period 
between 1980 and 2012.4   
 
 
 
Figure	4A.	Average	WTRs	on	Participation	Dividends	with	Unbalanced	Sample	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
                                                
4 Beside the newly signed double tax treaties, there were overall 166 (193) increases and 610 (215) 
decreases of the withholding tax rates on participation (portfolio) dividends in the existing double tax 
conventions for the period between 1950 and 2012.  
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Figure	4B.	Average	WTRs	on	Portfolio	Dividends	with	Unbalanced	Sample	
	
    Overall, it can be seen from all graphs that in line with the international tax 
competition models, declining withholding tax rates on dividends are observed 
when it comes to participation dividends, while the prediction of declining rates 
is less visible in the case of portfolio dividends. The remainder of Section 3 
presents three possible explanations for the differences in the international tax 
competition in the withholding tax rates on participation and portfolio dividends.  
3.1. Treaty Shopping 
One possible explanation for the differences in the international tax 
competition in the WTRs on participation and portfolio dividends may be 
connected to treaty shopping. Treaty shopping is the practice of taking 
advantage of the international tax treaty network and the most favorable tax 
treaty. For instance, this is the case if a person resident of a given State (State 
R) expects to derive dividends sourced in another State (State S) and decides 
to set up an entity in a third state (State C) that will receive the dividends in a 
more beneficial way than if such income were paid directly from State S to the 
person resident of State R (IBFD 2008). The reason for the tax advantage lies in 
the fact that the tax treaty between State S and State C provides for a lower 
withholding tax rate in State S on dividends paid to a State C resident than the 
rate that would apply in State S if the income were paid directly to the State R 
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resident. This occurs because there is either no treaty applicable between State 
R and State S or, if there is one, it provides for less generous withholding tax 
rates than those available to the State C resident under the treaty between S 
and C (IBFD 2008). Due to the fact that such treaty shopping is not possible for 
portfolio dividends, unlike in the case of participation dividends, there is no 
incentive to set the tax rates lower. Thus, the international tax competition may 
be stronger when it comes to participation dividends.  
3.2. Tax Credits for Withholding Taxes     
One possible argument for positive withholding tax rates on dividends can be 
found in Gordon (1992) who discusses whether capital income tax can survive 
in an open economy. Thinking of the US as a Stackelberg leader, he argues that 
the rationale for the US giving tax credits (until 2017) may have been that this 
encouraged other countries to impose source-based capital income tax, and by 
doing so prevented a capital flight that may otherwise erode the domestic capital 
income tax base. Moreover, as long as the withholding tax rate remains below 
the rate under domestic law faced by foreign investors on their portfolio income, 
the tax produces revenue without any loss to domestic residents. Therefore, for 
the countries offering a tax credit as their method of double tax relief, the 
rationale for concluding positive WTRs in the double tax treaties may be 
explained. 
3.3. Tax Systems Changes    
Another explanation for the increasing international tax competition in the case 
of participation dividends may be the rising pressure coming from the fact that 
the number of countries adopting the territorial tax system is rising (e.g. the UK 
and Japan in 2009). In a pure territorial tax system, the country taxes only 
corporations’ income derived within its borders. This is normally achieved by 
exempting from the domestic tax base the dividends received from foreign 
subsidiaries. By contrast, in a pure worldwide tax system, resident corporations 
are taxable on their worldwide income regardless of where the income is derived. 
For example, before the change in the tax system in 2018, a US investor directly 
investing in a country that has withholding tax rates can still be taxed on a 
residence basis even if he lives in a country that has a territorial tax system. 
Therefore, if the majority of the inbound investment were from countries with a 
worldwide tax system, withholding taxes in the source countries would have had 
lesser impact, and therefore tax competition would be cushioned. At the same 
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time, there is no move to territorial taxation for individuals, i.e., dividends 
received by individuals are usually taxable even in exemption countries. So, to 
the extent that portfolio dividends are paid to individuals, for these dividends a 
tax credit in the home country of the investor may be available and higher WTRs 
may not shy away these investors. This would help explain why there is a lesser 
response on the portfolio dividends, as shown in Figure 2B.  
4. Possible Reasons for Split Withholding Tax 
Rates on Dividends  
In Section 4, I investigate the reasons for split rates in the withholding tax rates 
on dividends. The section consists of two subsections. Section 4.1 presents a 
theoretical model that shows why home countries may have an interest in a high 
withholding tax rate in the host country and then an empirical test of the 
hypothesis. Section 4.2 shows another empirical estimation testing the 
hypothesis whether there is a spatial dependence on the rates of the countries’ 
peers that may be a driving factor for setting asymmetric rates.  
4.1. Why May Home Countries Have an Interest in a 
High Withholding Tax Rate in the Host Country? 
According to the International Monetary Fund (2010), there are two subgroups 
of foreign equity investments: foreign portfolio investments (FPI) and foreign 
direct investments (FDI). The foreign equity investments are defined as FDI (FPI) 
if investments contain more (less) than 10 percent of the controlling rights. The 
source country’s withholding tax rates applicable to dividends from FDI are 
typically lower than the rates for FPI - when targeted to specific countries via 
double tax treaties. If the minimum equity participation is not met, the portfolio 
withholding tax rates on the dividends will apply. 
The ways in which countries mitigate corporate taxation on dividend income 
are also different depending on whether this income is from FDI or FPI. For 
instance, with minimum equity participations being at least 10 percent of the 
foreign corporation, residence countries with a worldwide tax system provide a 
tax credit to a resident corporate shareholder for corporate income taxes paid by 
the foreign corporation (i.e. an indirect tax credit). Other countries mitigate 
corporate taxation on dividend income from FDI through dividends exemption or 
the use of a territorial tax system by taxing only domestic income. When it comes 
to foreign portfolio investments, most residence countries provide a tax credit for 
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withholding taxes paid to the source country. In the following theoretical model, 
I will use the feature that portfolio investors are usually taxed using the credit 
system.  
Consider an investor from home country A receiving dividends from host 
country B. His net return function, π, is described as  π = αD 1 − τ + T+ − αtD + 1 − α D 1 − τ − Dϕ 1 − α ;                               (1)  
where α denotes the share of dividends that is declared in the home country 
(i.e., an investor’s honesty factor); D are the received dividends5; τ is the 
withholding tax rate on dividends in the host country B; T+ is the tax credit in 
home country A with T+ = min	(tαD; ταD); t depicts the income tax rate in the 
home country A; Dϕ 1 − α  captures the cost of lying about the share of declared 
income; ϕ is assumed to be a weakly increasing, convex function of non-
declared dividends ϕ = Dϕ 1 − α .  
By assuming that τ < t, it follows that T+ = ταD. Taking this into account and 
taking the first-order condition with respect to investor’s honesty, α, yields:  t − τ = ϕ′,                                                                                                   (2)  
The interpretation of this expression is straightforward. It shows that the 
marginal benefit of the investor from paying the low withholding tax rather than 
the higher home tax has to equal his marginal cost of non-reporting dividends.  
Now, let us turn to the effect of the withholding tax rate in the host country, τ, 
on the investor’s honesty, α. Forming the first-order condition for maximization 
of π w.r.t. α6	and deriving the comparative static yields:  898: = ;<==,                                                                                                           (3)                                                                                                                          
which is positive, as ϕ′′ > 0 due to convexity. The fact that honesty increases in τ indicates why the home country may have an interest in a high withholding tax 
rate on dividends in the host country. When τ goes up, investor’s honesty 
increases as well and thereby also the declared income at home. Therefore, this 
may lead to more tax revenue in the home country. The above-mentioned 
expression illustrates why withholding tax rates on dividends may be introduced 
in double tax treaties. At the same time, a higher τ may be as it triggers a high 
tax credit.  
To evaluate the combined effect, consider the home tax revenue function:  T = αDt − T+.                                                                                                  (4)                                                                                                                              
Note that here an implicit assumption is that ϕ is not part of the revenue (which 
could be the case if some of ϕ represents fines). Noting that T+ = ταD and taking 
the first-order condition of T w.r.t. τ, yields:  
                                                
5 The model assumes constant dividends.  
6 Assuming an existing interior solution for α.	
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8@8: = 898: t − τ − α D                                                                                     (5)  
From (3), we know that  898: = ;<==.  Therefore, 	8@8: = ;<== t − τ − α D.                                                                                   (6)                                                                                                                            
The derived expression includes two effects. The second term of (6), αD, is the 
direct effect: a higher τ decreases tax revenue, as the tax credit on honest 
dividends increases. The first term of (6), ;<AA t − τ D, is the positive effect of 
additional honesty. With a larger 8@8:, the home country has a higher willingness 
to accept a high WTR by the source country. The total effect of the WTR on the 
tax revenue in the home country is positive if the effect coming from the additional 
honesty is bigger than the tax credit that has to be paid as a result.  
For a convex function of ϕ in the form of ϕ = Dθ 1 − α C with x>1, the first 
derivative will be ϕ′ = Dθx 1 − α CE; and the second derivative accordingly ϕ′′ = Dθ(x − 1)x 1 − α CEF.  
Since home country wants to maximize its tax revenue T, its preferred τ for a 
given t is found via setting  8@8: = 0. From (6), it follows that ϕ′′ = GE:9 .  
Hence,	t − τ = αDx(x − 1)θ(1 − α)CEF	.									                                                  (7)                                                                                     
Therefore, if θ or x go up, the preferred τ of the home country goes down. In 
other words, if lying gets costlier (for example, via exchange of information), the 
withholding tax rate of the host country is less relevant for the home country, as 
the honesty of the investor has increased. Overall, one can see that there is a 
negative connection between the tax avoidance in the home country and the 
withholding tax rate of the partner country.               
The remainder of the section will test whether for countries, which may be 
worried about tax avoidance and tax evasion and have a high number of 
concluded Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), such an interest in a 
high tax treaty withholding rate on portfolio dividends in the host country is 
reflected in tax treaties.  As laid out above, a high withholding tax rate on portfolio 
dividends increases investor’s honesty and thereby his declared income at 
home, which may lead to more tax revenue in the home country (see equation 
(3) of the theory model). Therefore, the hypothesis is that the extent to which 
countries are worried about tax evasion and tax avoidance will result in a high 
withholding tax rate on portfolio dividends in the host country and will not affect 
the withholding tax rate on participation dividends. The idea is that tax avoidance 
and tax evasion are likely for participation dividends and may occur via treaty 
shopping. However, as this option is more difficult for portfolio dividends and the 
high WTRs cannot be avoided so easily, countries may still have an incentive to 
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conclude high WTR on portfolio dividends in their double tax treaties if they are 
worried about tax avoidance and tax evasion.  
For the empirics, I use a pooled cross section across all years with available 
domestic tax data7 (between 1950 and 2012) and an OLS estimation 
methodology with time-, home- and host-fixed effects. The dependent variable is 
the tax treaty withholding rate on portfolio dividend in the host country in Table 2 
and the tax treaty withholding rate on participation dividend in the host country 
in Table 3. The explanatory variables are dummies taking the value of unity if 
home (host) country is an OECD member, OECD_o (OECD_d), as well as 
OECD_pair for the cases in which both home and host countries are OECD 
members. There are also dummy variables taking the value of unity if home 
(host) country is a EU member, EU_o (EU_d), as well as EU_pair for the cases 
in which both home and host countries are EU members. The same logic applies 
for the tax haven dummies: taxhaven_o, taxhaven_d and taxhaven_pair. 
Further, the variables taxdividends_o and taxdividends_d capture the domestic 
withholding tax on dividends (i.e., the withholding tax that applies where final 
shareholder-level tax is withheld by the distributing company) respectively in 
home and host country. There are also control variables depicting GDP (gdp_o 
and gdp_d), as well as GDP per capita (gdpcap_o and gdpcap_d) in both 
countries. Moreover, the variables tieas_o and tieas_d account for the number 
of TIEAs that home and host countries have in the particular year. These two 
variables are proxies8 for the extent to which non-haven countries are worried 
about tax avoidance and tax evasion.9 The rationale is that the more TIEAs there 
are in place, the higher the extent is to which countries are concerned about their 
residents trying to reduce the tax liability.  
Tables 2 and 3 present the results and Table 2A in the appendix shows the 
summary statistics for the estimated sample. The coefficient of TIEAs in the 
home country (tieas_o) on the withholding tax rates on portfolio dividends in the 
host country is statistically significant and positive in all columns and 
corresponds to the presented theory: countries that seem worried about tax 
avoidance and tax evasion and have a high number of concluded TIEAs may 
                                                
7 The dataset covers the period between 1950 and 2012. However, domestic tax data for all countries are 
available only after 2004.  
8 Another proxy for the extent to which countries are worried about tax avoidance and tax evasion is the 
tax morale variable from the World Values Survey (WVS 2015) that asks the question: “Do you justify 
cheating on taxes if you have the chance”, and takes the values between 1 (always) and 10 (never). The 
hypothesis is that countries, whose population is more likely to cheat on their taxes, may be worried about 
tax avoidance and tax evasion, and therefore have an interest in a high tax treaty withholding rate on 
portfolio dividends in the host country. The results in Table 2B remain unchanged and one can confirm 
the hypothesis that countries with population having a low tax morale are expected to have an interest in 
a high treaty withholding tax rate on portfolio dividends in the host country. 
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have an interest in a high tax treaty withholding rate on portfolio in the host 
country, as the high WTR increases investor’s honesty and thus his declared 
income and the tax revenue in the home country. At the same time, the 
coefficient of the concluded TIEAs in the host country is positive, indicating that 
those also seem to matter for the size of the withholding tax rates on portfolio 
dividends in the host country. Further, the coefficients of the EU countries 
dummies are negative and statistically significant across all columns in Table 2. 
This implies that EU countries have lower withholding tax rates on portfolio 
dividends in the host country.  
Fears about tax evasion refer to portfolio dividends, but are usually absent for 
dividends paid within multinational firms. Indeed, here dividends are often 
exempted and there is no incentive for underreporting in the home country. When 
it comes to the withholding tax rates on participation dividends, Table 3 indicates 
that the proxies for tax avoidance and tax evasion are not statistically significant. 
The finding implies that there is no connection between the extent to which 
countries are worried about tax avoidance and tax evasion and the withholding 
tax rate on participation dividends. Hence, this insignificance may be interpreted 
as a successful placebo test. Interestingly, if both countries are OECD members, 
they are more likely to negotiate in their double tax treaties a lower WTR on 
participation dividends.  
Finally, Table 4 reports a regression in which the dependent variable is the 
spread between the withholding tax rates on portfolio and participation dividends, 
and Figure 5 depicts its distribution for the last year of the sample. It can be seen 
that if countries are worried about tax avoidance and tax evasion (i.e., they have 
a high number of TIEAs), they are more likely to negotiate a high spread between 
the withholding tax rates in the portfolio and participation dividends in their 
double tax treaties. The high spread may result from a higher WTR on portfolio 
dividends or a lower WTR on participation dividends. However, from Tables 2 
and 3, we know that only the effect of TIEAs on the WTR on portfolio dividends 
is statistically significant. Therefore, countries that are more worried about tax 
avoidance and tax evasion are also more likely to have a higher WTR on portfolio 
dividends in the host country, and have thereby a higher spread between the 
WTRs on portfolio and participation dividends. What is more, OECD and EU 
countries have a lower spread between the WTRs on dividends. This may be 
due to lower WTR on portfolio or higher WTR on participation dividends. Finally, 
if there is a high taxation on dividends in domestic law of home/host country, the 
spread between the WTRs on portfolio and participation dividends is higher as 
well.  
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The above-mentioned findings may be the explanation of Figures 2A and 2B 
in the paper. From Section 2, we know that the WTRs on portfolio dividends are 
characterized by an upward trend in the years before mid-1990 and remain 
relatively stable after that (see Figure 2A). One explanation for this may be found 
in the current empirical section and may be related to the increasing concern of 
tax avoidance and tax evasion. Countries that are more worried about tax 
avoidance and tax evasion, are more likely to negotiate a higher treaty WTR on 
portfolio dividends in the host country. At the same time, there is a downward 
trend of the WTR on participation dividends over the years (see Figure 2B). As 
tax avoidance and tax evasion are likely for this type of dividends due to treaty 
shopping, countries may not try to keep them high and tax competition may 
dominate.  
The increasing spread between the WTRs of the portfolio and participation 
dividends may be an indicator that some countries are increasingly worried about 
tax avoidance and tax evasion in the case of portfolio dividends but are willing to 
reduce rates for participation dividends where tax avoidance is a much lesser 
issue.  
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Table	2:	Tax	Treaty	Withholding	Rates	on	Portfolio	Dividends	in	the	Host	Country	
VARIABLES	
(1)	WTR	on	host’	
portfolio	dividends	
	
(2)	WTR	on	host’	
portfolio	dividends	
	
(3)	WTR	on	host’	
portfolio	dividends	
	
(4)	WTR	on	host’	
portfolio	dividends	
	
gdp_o	 -8.04e-17	 2.80e-17	 	 	
	 (2.34e-16)	 (2.36e-16)	 	  
gdp_d 5.05e-16*	 6.11e-16**	 	  
	 (2.87e-16)	 (2.89e-16)	 	  
gdpcap_o 8.09e-08**	 6.85e-08*	 	  
	 (3.82e-08)	 (3.86e-08)	 	  
gdpcap_d 5.76e-08	 4.58e-08	 	  
	 (4.18e-08)	 (4.19e-08)	 	  
ln_gdp_o 	 	 -0.00187	 -0.000774 
	 	 	 (0.00517)	 (0.00514)	
ln_gdp_d	 	 	 -0.00779	 -0.00670	
	 	 	 (0.00508)	 (0.00506)	
ln_gdpcap_o	 	 	 0.00248	 0.00242	
	 	 	 (0.00534)	 (0.00533)	
ln_gdpcap_d	 	 	 0.00899*	 0.00893*	
	 	 	 (0.00526)	 (0.00525)	
tieas_o	 	 8.73e-05***	 	 0.000103***	
	 	 (3.36e-05)	 	 (3.45e-05)	
tieas_d	 	 8.78e-05**	 	 0.000101**	
	 	 (3.89e-05)	 	 (4.03e-05)	
OECD_o	 -0.00393	 -0.00357	 -0.00396	 -0.00347	
	 (0.00242)	 (0.00242)	 (0.00242)	 (0.00242)	
OECD_d	 -0.00245	 -0.00210	 -0.00257	 -0.00210	
	 (0.00234)	 (0.00234)	 (0.00233)	 (0.00234)	
OECD_pair	 -0.00396	 -0.00399	 -0.00396	 -0.00400	
	 (0.00296)	 (0.00296)	 (0.00296)	 (0.00296)	
EU_o	 -0.00480**	 -0.00442**	 -0.00536**	 -0.00503**	
	 (0.00207)	 (0.00208)	 (0.00210)	 (0.00210)	
EU_d	 -0.00445**	 -0.00410**	 -0.00560***	 -0.00530**	
	 (0.00206)	 (0.00207)	 (0.00209)	 (0.00209)	
EU_pair	 0.00411	 0.00414	 0.00411	 0.00413	
	 (0.00321)	 (0.00321)	 (0.00321)	 (0.00321)	
taxhaven_o	 -0.00657	 -0.00671	 -0.00638	 -0.00783	
	 (0.0133)	 (0.0133)	 (0.0133)	 (0.0134)	
taxhaven_d	 -0.0110	 -0.0112	 -0.0107	 -0.0122	
	 (0.0146)	 (0.0146)	 (0.0147)	 (0.0147)	
taxhaven_pair	 -0.00607	 -0.00607	 -0.00605	 -0.00605	
	 (0.00654)	 (0.00654)	 (0.00654)	 (0.00654)	
taxdividends_o	 -0.00270	 -0.00159	 -0.00308	 -0.00147	
	 (0.00373)	 (0.00381)	 (0.00367)	 (0.00376)	
taxdividends_d	 0.00272	 0.00377	 0.00228	 0.00380	
	 (0.00328)	 (0.00339)	 (0.00323)	 (0.00338)	
Time-fixed	effects	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Home-fixed	effects	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Host-fixed	effects	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Observations	 33,310	 33,310	 33,310	 33,310	
R-squared	 0.468 0.468	 0.468	 0.468	
Note:	Robust	standards	errors	in	parentheses	are	clustered	by	country	pair	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.		
The	dependent	variable	is	the	tax	treaty	withholding	rate	on	portfolio	dividends	in	the	host	countries.		
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Table	3:	Tax	Treaty	Withholding	Rates	on	Participation	Dividends	in	the	Host	Country	
	VARIABLES	
(1)	WTR	on	host’	
participation	
dividends	
(2)	WTR	on	host’	
participation	
dividends	
(3)	WTR	on	host’		
participation	
dividends	
(4)	WTR	on	host’		
participation	
dividends	
gdp_o	 -6.42e-16*	 	-6.91e-16**	 	  
 (3.37e-16)	 (3.40e-16)	 	  
gdp_d	 -1.93e-16	 -2.43e-16	 	  
 (3.38e-16)	 (3.40e-16)	 	  
gdpcap_o	 -9.79e-08**	 -9.23e-08**	 	  
 (4.07e-08)	 (3.98e-08)	 	  
gdpcap_d	 -1.25e-07***	 -1.19e-07**	 	  
 (4.69e-08)	 (4.66e-08)	 	  
ln_gdp_o	 	 	 0.00705*	 0.00680*	
	 	 	 (0.00367)	 (0.00368)	
ln_gdp_d	 	 	 0.00393	 0.00362	
	 	 	 (0.00370)	 (0.00370)	
ln_gdpcap_o	 	 	 -0.00507	 -0.00505	
	 	 	 (0.00374)	 (0.00374)	
ln_gdpcap_d	 	 	 -0.00158	 -0.00157	
	 	 	 (0.00382)	 (0.00381)	
tieas_o	 	 -3.95e-05	 	 -2.35e-05	
	 	 (3.25e-05)	 	 (3.52e-05)	
tieas_d	 	 -4.17e-05	 	 -2.93e-05	
	 	 (3.77e-05)	 	 (3.96e-05)	
OECD_o	 0.00191	 0.00175	 0.00224	 0.00213	
	 (0.00261)	 (0.00261)	 (0.00262)	 (0.00263)	
OECD_d	 0.00427*	 0.00410*	 0.00450*	 0.00436*	
	 (0.00230)	 (0.00231)	 (0.00231)	 (0.00232)	
OECD_pair	 -0.00682**	 -0.00680**	 -0.00680**	 -0.00679**	
	 (0.00334)	 (0.00334)	 (0.00334)	 (0.00334)	
EU_o	 -0.000201	 -0.000372	 0.000393	 0.000315	
	 (0.00223)	 (0.00223)	 (0.00225)	 (0.00225)	
EU_d	 -1.83e-05	 -0.000185	 0.000263	 0.000181	
	 (0.00223)	 (0.00223)	 (0.00225)	 (0.00225)	
EU_pair	 -0.00101	 -0.00102	 -0.00106	 -0.00106	
	 (0.00369)	 (0.00369)	 (0.00369)	 (0.00369)	
taxhaven_o	 0.0137	 0.0137	 0.0101	 0.0104	
	 (0.0176)	 (0.0176)	 (0.0178)	 (0.0178)	
taxhaven_d	 0.0125	 0.0126	 0.00885	 0.00927	
	 (0.0190)	 (0.0190)	 (0.0192)	 (0.0192)	
taxhaven_pair	 -0.00124	 -0.00123	 -0.00124	 -0.00124	
	 (0.00498)	 (0.00498)	 (0.00498)	 (0.00498)	
taxdividends_o	 -0.00889**	 -0.00939**	 -0.00741*	 -0.00778**	
	 (0.00383)	 (0.00387)	 (0.00378)	 (0.00377)	
taxdividends_d	 -0.00251	 -0.00301	 -0.000948	 -0.00138	
	 (0.00256)	 (0.00265)	 (0.00254)	 (0.00263)	
Time-fixed	effects	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Home-fixed	effects	 YES YES	 YES	 YES	
Host-fixed	effects	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Observations	 33,310 33,310	 33,310	 33,310	
R-squared	 0.453 0.453 0.453 0.453 
Note:	Robust	standards	errors	in	parentheses	are	clustered	by	country	pair	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.		
The	dependent	variable	is	the	tax	treaty	withholding	rate	on	participation	dividends	in	the	host	countries.	
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Table	4:	Spread	Between	the	WTRs	on	Portfolio	and	Participation	Dividends	in	the	Host	Country	
	VARIABLES	
(1)	Spread	on	
partner’s	
dividends		
	
	
(2)	Spread	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
	
	
(3)	Spread	on	
partner’s		
dividends	
	
	
(4)	Spread	on	
partner’s		
dividends	
	
	
gdp_o	 5.62e-16*	 7.19e-16**	 	  
 (3.39e-16)	 (3.36e-16)	 	  
gdp_d	 6.99e-16**	 8.54e-16**	 	  
 (3.52e-16)	 (3.50e-16)	 	  
gdpcap_o	 1.79e-07***	 1.61e-07***	 	  
 (4.27e-08)	 (4.18e-08)	 	  
gdpcap_d	 1.83e-07***	 1.65e-07***	 	  
 (4.32e-08)	 (4.25e-08)	 	  
ln_gdp_o	 	 	 -0.00892**	 -0.00757*	
	 	 	 (0.00411)	 (0.00409)	
ln_gdp_d	 	 	 -0.0117***	 -0.0103**	
	 	 	 (0.00404)	 (0.00402)	
ln_gdpcap_o	 	 	 0.00755*	 0.00747*	
	 	 	 (0.00426)	 (0.00424)	
ln_gdpcap_d	 	 	 0.0106**	 0.0105**	
	 	 	 (0.00419)	 (0.00417)	
tieas_o	 	 0.000127***	 	 0.000127***	
	 	 (3.52e-05)	 	 (3.67e-05)	
tieas_d	 	 0.000130***	 	 0.000130***	
	 	 (3.76e-05)	 	 (3.91e-05)	
OECD_o	 -0.00584**	 -0.00532**	 -0.00620***	 -0.00560**	
	 (0.00236)	 (0.00236)	 (0.00237)	 (0.00236)	
OECD_d	 -0.00672***	 -0.00620***	 -0.00707***	 -0.00647***	
	 (0.00229)	 (0.00229)	 (0.00229)	 (0.00230)	
OECD_pair	 0.00286	 0.00281	 0.00284	 0.00279	
	 (0.00329)	 (0.00330)	 (0.00329)	 (0.00330)	
EU_o	 -0.00460**	 -0.00405*	 -0.00575***	 -0.00535**	
	 (0.00214)	 (0.00215)	 (0.00215)	 (0.00215)	
EU_d	 -0.00443**	 -0.00391*	 -0.00586***	 -0.00549***	
	 (0.00212)	 (0.00213)	 (0.00213)	 (0.00213)	
EU_pair	 0.00511	 0.00516	 0.00517	 0.00520	
	 (0.00373)	 (0.00373)	 (0.00373)	 (0.00373)	
taxhaven_o	 -0.0202	 -0.0204	 -0.0164	 -0.0182	
	 (0.0131)	 (0.0131)	 (0.0133)	 (0.0132)	
taxhaven_d	 -0.0236*	 -0.0238*	 -0.0196	 -0.0214*	
	 (0.0128)	 (0.0128)	 (0.0129)	 (0.0129)	
taxhaven_pair	 -0.00483	 -0.00483	 -0.00482	 -0.00481	
	 (0.00526)	 (0.00527)	 (0.00527)	 (0.00527)	
taxdividends_o	 0.00619**	 0.00780***	 0.00434	 0.00631**	
	 (0.00282)	 (0.00297)	 (0.00280)	 (0.00295)	
taxdividends_d	 0.00524*	 0.00678**	 0.00323	 0.00518*	
	 (0.00285)	 (0.00300)	 (0.00281)	 (0.00298)	
Time-fixed	effects		 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Home-fixed	effects	 YES YES	 YES	 YES	
Host-fixed	effects	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Observations	 33,310 33,310	 33,310	 33,310	
R-squared	 0.413	 0.413	 0.413	 0.413	
Note:	Robust	standards	errors	in	parentheses	are	clustered	by	country	pair	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.	
The	dependent	variable	is	the	spread	between	the	tax	treaty	WTR	on	portfolio	and	participation	dividends	in	the	
host	countries.		
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Figure	5.	Distribution	of	the	Spread	between	WTRs	on	Portfolio	and	Participation	
Dividends	in	2012	
	
	
4.2. Spatial Dependence 
Previous studies on withholding tax rates suggest a spatial dependence 
between countries’ policies. Section 4.2 examines whether this holds for the 
decision on split rates for portfolio and participation dividends and whether those 
are affected by the peer countries. Chisik and Davies (2004) and Barthel and 
Neumayer (2012) propose that countries consider the spatial interdependencies 
in the global tax treaties network when negotiating their treaty rates. They show 
that the probability of two countries concluding a DTT increases with peer 
countries having signed a treaty with the same treaty partner. However, their 
findings are limited to the diff usion of DTTs as such and do not consider their 
content. Petkova et al. (2019) fill this void by extending the tax treaty bargaining 
framework to spatial dependence in treaty withholding tax rates. The authors 
show that tax treaty rates are influenced by treaty rates negotiated by any of the 
two signatory countries with the peers of the other one and find a positive 
relationship between the spatial interaction terms and the negotiated withholding 
tax rates. Following up on this finding, the current paper wants to see whether 
there are spillover effects10 also when it comes to asymmetric withholding tax 
                                                
10 Two countries are defined as spatially connected if they share the same geographical region at the 
intermediate level according to the UN M49 standard (Petkova et al. 2019).  
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rates on dividends, i.e., the decision to have split rates. Therefore, the hypothesis 
to be tested is that countries are influenced by the already signed tax treaties 
and the withholding tax rates negotiated by their peers, when deciding on having 
split withholding tax rates in their double tax treaties. The second hypothesis to 
be tested is whether the spread itself (i.e., the difference between the WTRs on 
portfolio and participation dividends negotiated in the tax treaty) is also affected 
by the peer countries.  
For the purpose of testing both hypotheses, I estimate a pooled cross section 
across all years in the sample in the following form (standard errors are clustered 
by country-pair) using OLS with multiple high-dimensional fixed effects (HDFE), 
so that I can control for multiple sources of heterogeneity: SplitLM,G = α + ρMSplitM,GEOωM + βLXL,G + βMXM,G + γVLM,G + θL + ϑM + λG + ςrL,G + χrM,G+ ξLM,G SpreadLM,G = α + ρMSpreadM,GEOωM + βLXL,G + βMXM,G + γVLM,G + θL + ϑM + λG + ςrL,G + χrM,G+ ξLM,G 
where SplitLM,G is an indicator variable taking the value of one if there is an 
asymmetry (i.e. two different rates) in the treaty withholding tax rates on 
dividends between source country i and target country j in year of treaty 
conclusion t; ρMSplitM,GEOωM	is the spatial interaction term between the spatial 
weight matrix at a subregion level of the target country j and an asymmetry 
withholding tax rates matrix of source country i with all other potential targets m, 
n11  years before treaty year - target lag.12 Analogically, for the second estimation, 
the dependent variable SpreadLM,G is the difference in the WTRs on portfolio and 
participation dividends in the tax treaty between source country i and target 
country j in year of treaty conclusion t; ρMSpreadM,GEOωM	is the spatial interaction 
term between the spatial weight matrix at a subregion level of the target country 
j and an spread withholding tax rates matrix of source country i with all other 
potential targets m, n years before treaty year - target lag. Further, XL,G and XM,G 
are vectors of source, respectively target specific factors that aff ect their 
bargaining position, especially GDP and GDP per capita; V is a vector of 
variables characterizing the bilateral relationship between source i and target j; θL and ϑM are source, respectively target-region-country fixed eff ects; λG is a 
vector of year dummies; ςrL,G and χrM,G are source-region-year, respectively target-
region-year fixed eff ects; and ξLM,G	is the error term. The independent variables 
                                                
11 Tables 5 and 6 present the results with a time lag of the spatial contagion variables with n = 2 years.  
12  I look only at the one spatial lag, the target lag, as the source and target lag are identical for all cases 
in which the withholding tax rates concluded in the double tax treaties are the same in both directions. In 
other words, for every pair ij as well as ji, in which i is the source and j the target country, the WTRs are 
identical.   
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are the same as in Tables 2-4. Further, I alleviate the concerns about the 
endogeneity of the spatial interaction terms by exploiting the time dimension of 
tax treaty bargaining. In particular, I lag the spatial interaction terms 2 years 
before treaty conclusion in year t - i.e. before the corresponding withholding tax 
rates and the existence of a split in the dividend rates are being observed - and 
assume that while past treaty rates can affect the yet to be negotiated ones, this 
relationship does not reverse. Hence, I can estimate the model by OLS and there 
is no need to resort to ML.  
The results are presented in Table 5 (for the split) and Table 6 (for the spread). 
Tables 5A, 5B and 5C show the summary statistics for the estimated sample.13 
Columns 1-4 in Table 5 depict the results for the OLS estimation and columns 5-
6 use a Probit estimation14, as the zeros in the dependent variable may be a 
problem to the estimation. The latter method is also a robust approach in the 
presence of heteroscedasticity.  
From Table 5, one can see that the target lag term is positive and statistically 
significant across all specifications indicating that countries look at whether their 
peers have asymmetric rates on the treaty withholding tax rates on dividends, 
and if yes, they are more likely to have such splits as well. In other words, the 
asymmetry in the treaty WTRs may be influenced by the existing asymmetry in 
the double tax treaties by any of the two signatory countries with the peers of the 
other one. Therefore, there may be a spatial dependence on the rates of the 
countries’ peers than can be a driving factor for setting asymmetric rates.  
Interestingly, OECD countries do not have a higher probability of having a split. 
This is surprising to the extent that one may expect that OECD countries, which 
may prefer the OECD Model Tax Convention15 as their guideline when 
concluding double tax treaties, decide on having different WTRs on portfolio and 
participation dividends. In contrast to the UN Model Convention16 that leaves the 
percentages open to be established during the bilateral negotiations, there is a 
significant difference in the OECD Model Convention, namely the differentiation 
in the withholding tax rates between the dividend types. The OECD Model 
                                                
13 Tables 5E and 6D in the appendix reproduce Tables 5 and 6, but keep only new treaties as separate 
observations. Results remain robust.	
14 In columns 4-6, not all multiple high-dimensional fixed effects (HDFE) are used, as they are not feasible 
with a Probit estimation.  
15 When it comes to double tax treaties, there are two main model conventions that countries could use 
as a guideline for establishing tax agreements – the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital and the United Nations Model 
Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries (the UN Model Convention). 
By 1963 a full draft of the OECD Model Tax Convention was ready. It was the consolidation of four earlier 
drafts, the first one of which was published in 1958. Therefore, most people consider that the birth of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention was July, 1st 1958 (OECD Observer No. 269, October 2008). The draft 
United Nations Model Convention was reviewed by the Group of Experts in Geneva in 1979 and the final 
text of the Convention was adopted (United Nations 1980, E.80. XVI.3).  
16 It should also be noted that the threshold to qualify for foreign direct investment (FDI) and therefore for 
the lower withholding tax rate on participation dividends, as opposed to portfolio investment and the higher 
withholding tax rate on portfolio dividends, is lower in the UN Model Convention than in the OECD Model 
Tax Convention - 10% versus 25% of the capital of the company paying the dividends (Lennard 2008).		
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Convention suggests different withholding tax rates for portfolio dividends (15%) 
and for participation dividends (5%). However, the reason for the absence of 
such an effect on the decision to have split rates may be connected with the fact 
that this effect is captured by the positive coefficient of the target lag. Apparently, 
when deciding to have different WTRs on dividends, countries look rather at their 
peers than at the fact whether their treaty partner is an OECD member or not.  
Table 6 examines the spatial dependence of the spread in the withholding tax 
rates on portfolio and participation dividends. It reproduces Table 417, but 
includes the target lag. The coefficients remain unchanged and one can still see 
that if countries are worried about tax avoidance and tax evasion (i.e., they have 
a high number of TIEAs), they are more likely to negotiate a high spread between 
the withholding tax rates in the portfolio and participation dividends in their 
double tax treaties. What is more, in line with the results in Table 4, OECD 
countries have a lower spread between the WTRs on dividends. When it comes 
to the target lag, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant across all 
columns, indicating that countries are more likely to have a high spread between 
the WTRs on portfolio and participation dividends if their peers have a high 
spread as well.  
Overall, both Table 5 and Table 6 show that countries are influenced by the 
already signed tax treaties and the withholding tax rates negotiated by their 
peers, when deciding on having split withholding tax rates in their double tax 
treaties, while the spread itself (i.e., the difference between the portfolio and 
participation dividends negotiated in the tax treaty) is also affected by the peer 
countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
17 For a reproduction of Table 5 in the same way, look at Table 5D in the appendix.  
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Table	5:	Spatial	Dependence	of	a	Split	in	the	Withholding	Tax	Rates	on	Dividends	
		 (1)	OLS	 (2)	OLS	 (3)	OLS	 (4)	OLS	 (5)	Probit	 (6)	Probit	
VARIABLES	
Split	in	
WTRs	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
Split	in	
WTRs	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
Split	in	
WTRs	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
Split	in	
WTRs	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
Split	in	
WTRs	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
Split	in	
WTRs	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
target_lag	 0.1658***	 0.165***	 0.166***	 0.164***	 0.5973***	 0.5963***	
	 (0.0377)	 (0.0382)	 (0.0377)	 (0.0381)	 (0.1384)	 (0.1383)	
gdp_o	 1.37e-14**	 1.16e-14	 	 	 5.46e-14**	 	
 (5.85e-15)	 (7.06e-15)	 	 	 (2.37e-14)	 	
gdp_d	 1.20e-14**	 1.04e-14	 	 	 3.51e-14*	 	
 (5.74e-15)	 (7.01e-15)	 	 	 (2.00e-14)	 	
gdpcap_o	 6.65e-07	 3.60e-07	 	 	 2.44e-06	 	
 (4.06e-07)	 (5.26e-07)	 	 	 (1.61e-06)	 	
gdpcap_d	 6.68e-07*	 3.11e-07	 	 	 3.26e-06**	 	
 (3.92e-07)	 (5.08e-07)	 	 	 (1.64e-06)	 	
LNgdp_o	 	 	 -0.116**	 -0.116*	 	 -0.3857**	
	 	 	 (0.0459)	 (0.0673)	 	 (0.1620)	
LNgdp_d	 	 	 -0.0807*	 -0.119*	 	 -0.2545	
	 	 	 (0.0477)	 (0.0694)	 	 (0.1678)	
LNgdpcap_o	 	 	 0.134***	 0.132**	 	 0.4598***	
	 	 	 (0.0479)	 (0.0652)	 	 (0.1686)	
LNgdpcap_d	 	 	 0.0971*	 0.118*	 	 0.3151*	
	 	 	 (0.0497)	 (0.0672)	 	 (0.1735)	
tieas_o	 0.000669**	 0.000765*	 0.000962***	 0.00097**	 0.0036***	 0.0039***	
	 (0.000294)	 (0.000445)	 (0.000319)	 (0.00045)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0012)	
tieas_d	 0.0184	 0.000496	 0.000705**	 0.000669	 0.0025**	 0.0029**	
	 (0.0283)	 (0.000409)	 (0.000297)	 (0.00042)	 (0.0011)	 (0.0011)	
OECD_o	 -0.0331	 -0.0358	 -0.0363	 -0.0391	 -0.1393	 -0.1473*	
	 (0.0236)	 (0.0244)	 (0.0236)	 (0.0244)	 (0.0850)	 (0.0849)	
OECD_d	 -0.0286	 -0.0318	 -0.0317	 -0.0349	 -0.1211	 -0.1248	
	 (0.0243)	 (0.0252)	 (0.0243)	 (0.0252)	 (0.0870)	 (0.0869)	
OECD_pair	 -0.0159	 -0.0154	 -0.0160	 -0.0153	 -0.0607	 -0.0617	
	 (0.0341)	 (0.0342)	 (0.0340)	 (0.0342)	 (0.1284)	 (0.1283)	
EU_o	 -0.0157	 -0.0112	 -0.0346	 -0.0191	 -0.0419	 -0.1093	
	 (0.0247)	 (0.0256)	 (0.0249)	 (0.0257)	 (0.0827)	 (0.0834)	
EU_d	 -0.0143	 -0.00581	 -0.0301	 -0.0122	 -0.0402	 -0.0954	
	 (0.0242)	 (0.0252)	 (0.0244)	 (0.0253)	 (0.0785)	 (0.0789)	
EU_pair	 -0.0177	 -0.0177	 -0.0175	 -0.0177	 -0.1005	 -0.0990	
	 (0.0371)	 (0.0401)	 (0.0371)	 (0.0373)	 (0.1388)	 (0.1388)	
taxhaven_o	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -0.6210	 -0.6265	
	 -	 -	 -	 -	 (0.4913)	 (0.4917)	
taxhaven_d	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -0.4561	 -0.4639	
	 -	 -	 -	 -	 (0.4764)	 (0.4777)	
taxhaven_pair	 0.00094***	 -0.0603	 -0.0592	 -0.0599	 -0.3217	 -0.3209	
	 (0.000314)	 (0.0512)	 (0.0511)	 (0.0512)	 (0.2280)	 (0.2280)	
taxdividends_o	 0.0213	 -0.000879	 0.0125	 -0.00583	 0.0205	 0.0017	
	 (0.0287)	 (0.0318)	 (0.0280)	 (0.0320)	 (0.1085)	 (0.1074)	
taxdividends_d	 0.00094*** 0.0177	 0.0170	 0.00960	 0.0164	 -0.0003	
	 (0.000314)	 (0.0320)	 (0.0284)	 (0.0322)	 (0.1165)	 (0.1153)	
Time-fixed	effects	 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Home-fixed	effects	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Host-fixed	effects	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Source-region-year	
fixed	effects	 NO	 YES	 NO	 YES	 NO	 NO	
Target-region-year	
fixed	effects	 NO	 YES	 NO	 YES	 NO	 NO	
Observations	 34,396	 34,396	 34,396	 34,396	 33,676	 33,676	
R-squared	 0.359	 0.359	 0.359	 0.359	 		 		
Pseudo	R-squared	 	 	 	 	 0.2985	 0.2985	
Note:	Robust	standards	errors	in	parentheses	are	clustered	by	country	pair	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.		
The	dependent	variable	is	a	dummy	variable	having	the	value	of	unity	if	a	country	has	asymmetric	rates	on	dividends	
in	the	double	tax	treaty	with	its	partner,	i.e.	it	prescribes	different	rates	on	the	withholding	tax	rates	on	portfolio	and	
participation	dividends.		
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Table	6:	Spatial	Dependence	of	a	Spread	between	the	Withholding	Tax	Rates	on	Portfolio	
and	Participation	Dividends	
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
VARIABLES	
Spread	of	
WTR	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
Spread	of	
WTR	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
Spread	of	
WTR	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
Spread	of	
WTR	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
target_lag	 0.217***	 0.215***	 0.217***	 0.215***	
	 (0.0260)	 (0.0262)	 (0.0260)	 (0.0262)	
gdp_o	 6.31e-16*	 4.72e-16	 	 	
 (3.65e-16)	 (4.74e-16)	 	 	
gdp_d	 8.12e-16**	 1.20e-15**	 	 	
 (3.91e-16)	 (5.82e-16)	 	 	
gdpcap_o	 1.33e-07***	 7.62e-08	 	 	
 (4.44e-08)	 (5.95e-08)	 	 	
gdpcap_d	 1.18e-07***	 1.13e-07**	 	 	
 (4.44e-08)	 (5.68e-08)	 	 	
LNgdp_o	 	 	 -0.00282	 -0.00488	
	 	 	 (0.00504)	 (0.00715)	
LNgdp_d	 	 	 -0.00843**	 -0.00738	
	 	 	 (0.00417)	 (0.00603)	
LNgdpcap_o	 	 	 0.00189	 0.00292	
	 	 	 (0.00521)	 (0.00695)	
LNgdpcap_d	 	 	 0.00799*	 0.00825	
	 	 	 (0.00425)	 (0.00579)	
tieas_o	 8.52e-05**	 6.97e-05	 8.15e-05**	 7.93e-05	
	 (3.46e-05)	 (4.85e-05)	 (3.54e-05)	 (4.99e-05)	
tieas_d	 0.000101***	 7.55e-05	 9.48e-05**	 9.50e-05*	
	 (3.83e-05)	 (5.18e-05)	 (3.91e-05)	 (5.27e-05)	
OECD_o	 -0.00588**	 -0.00597**	 -0.00619**	 -0.00591**	
	 (0.00257)	 (0.00262)	 (0.00258)	 (0.00263)	
OECD_d	 -0.00577**	 -0.00608**	 -0.00602**	 -0.00609**	
	 (0.00246)	 (0.00252)	 (0.00247)	 (0.00252)	
OECD_pair	 0.00221	 0.00223	 0.00219	 0.00223	
	 (0.00335)	 (0.00337)	 (0.00335)	 (0.00337)	
EU_o	 -0.00284	 -0.00287	 -0.00347	 -0.00303	
	 (0.00237)	 (0.00245)	 (0.00237)	 (0.00244)	
EU_d	 -0.00313	 -0.00289	 -0.00428**	 -0.00350	
	 (0.00214)	 (0.00222)	 (0.00214)	 (0.00221)	
EU_pair	 0.00314	 0.00318	 0.00317	 0.00318	
	 (0.00372)	 (0.00374)	 (0.00372)	 (0.00374)	
taxhaven_o	 -	 -	 -	 -	
	 -	 -	 -	 -	
taxhaven_d	 -	 -	 -	 -	
	 -	 -	 -	 -	
taxhaven_pair	 -0.00406	 -0.00414	 -0.00407	 -0.00412	
	 (0.00561)	 (0.00562)	 (0.00561)	 (0.00562)	
taxdividends_o	 0.00607**	 0.00423	 0.00469	 0.00293	
	 (0.00309)	 (0.00341)	 (0.00308)	 (0.00344)	
taxdividends_d	 0.00396	 0.00149	 0.00247	 0.000195	
	 (0.00348)	 (0.00374)	 (0.00344)	 (0.00376)	
	 	 	 	 	
Time-fixed	effects	 YES YES	 YES	 YES	
Home-fixed	effects	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Host-fixed	effects	 YES YES	 YES	 YES	
Source-region-year	fixed	
effects	 NO YES NO YES 
Target-region-year	fixed	effects	 NO	 YES	 NO	 YES	
Observations	 29,876	 29,875	 29,876	 29,875	
R-squared	 0.428	 0.428	 0.428	 0.428	
Note:	Robust	standards	errors	in	parentheses	are	clustered	by	country	pair	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.		
The	dependent	variable	is	the	spread	between	the	tax	treaty	withholding	rate	on	portfolio	and	participation	
dividends	in	the	host	countries.	
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5. Conclusion	
Out of all double tax treaties (DTTs) in force in 2012, around 41% are 
symmetric and 59% are asymmetric, i.e., they prescribe different dividend 
withholding tax rates (WTRs) depending on the foreign investor’s ownership 
fraction. To my knowledge, this is the first, and so far only, paper dealing with 
this phenomenon, namely why some countries in their DTTs prefer homogenous 
withholding tax rates over separate rates for participation and portfolio dividends.  
The paper also fills a gap in the literature by asking why and to what extent tax 
rates of cross-border flows such as dividends have survived over the years. With 
some qualifications applying, the international tax competition models would 
predict zero, or at least declining rates. Interestingly, the trends differ for the WTR 
on participation and portfolio dividends. While in the case of participation 
dividends a downward trend after 1990 may be observed, portfolio dividends are 
characterized by an upward trend in the years before mid-1990 and remain 
relatively stable after that. Since the early 1980s, tax treaty WTRs on portfolio 
dividends have on average increased by about 5.5 percent, while the average 
rate on participating dividends has fallen almost by 19.5 percent until 2012. 
Further, the paper provides a possible explanation for the higher WTR on 
portfolio dividends and it may be connected to the increased concern about tax 
avoidance and tax evasion. In a theoretical model, I demonstrate why home 
countries may have an interest in a high withholding tax rate in the host country, 
even though they do not receive the revenue from this tax. In particular, this is 
the case for the WTR on portfolio dividends. The high WTR increases investor’s 
honesty and thus his declared income and the tax revenue in the home country. 
The empirical section confirms that countries that are more worried about tax 
avoidance and tax evasion are more likely to negotiate a higher treaty WTR on 
portfolio dividends in the host country. As treaty shopping is more difficult for 
portfolio dividends and the high WTRs cannot be avoided so easily, there is no 
incentive for the countries as in the case of participation dividends to set their 
treaty tax rates lower. Also, the increasing spread between the WTR of the 
portfolio and participation dividends may be an indicator that some countries are 
increasingly worried about tax avoidance and tax evasion in the case of portfolio 
dividends but are willing to reduce rates for participation dividends where tax 
avoidance is a much lesser issue.  
Moreover, the paper does not only look into possible determinants of the 
withholding tax rates on dividends. It also tries to answer the question why there 
are different rates for participation and portfolio dividends in many double tax 
treaties. One explanation for the decision to have different WTRs on dividends 
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may be connected with the fact that countries look at whether their peers have 
asymmetric rates on the treaty withholding tax rates on dividends, and if yes, 
they are more likely to have such splits as well.  There is also confirming 
evidence that countries are influenced by the already signed tax treaties and the 
withholding tax rates negotiated by their peers, when deciding on having split 
withholding tax rates in their double tax treaties, while the spread itself (i.e., the 
difference between the WTRs on portfolio and participation dividends negotiated 
in the tax treaty) is also affected by the peer countries.  
The paper deals with an understudied area and identifies one phenomenon – 
the phenomenon why some countries in their double tax treaties prefer 
homogenous withholding tax rates over separate rates for participation and 
portfolio dividends. Therefore, it offers many opportunities for future research on 
the topic. For instance, one can try to find any further reasons for the 
differentiation in the WTRs and the different development of the WTRs on 
dividends over time. Moreover, one can also use other proxies for the extent to 
which countries are worried about tax avoidance and tax evasion. It may also be 
interesting to conduct the analysis on a more disaggregated level and see what 
motivates the decision to have split rates on a country-level.  
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Appendix A. Constellations for the Withholding 
Tax Rates on Dividends in the Double Tax 
Treaties 
This appendix reproduces Table 1 by looking at the development of the 
withholding tax rates on portfolio and participation dividends over time and 
depicting the same constellations for 2005 and 1980.  
	
Table	1A:	Constellations	for	the	Withholding	Tax	Rates	on	Dividends	in	the	Double	Tax	
Treaties	in	2005	
1.	Uniform	rates	 2.	Split	rates	both	countries	 3.	Split	rates	one	country	
1.1.	Equal	rates:	
1.420	
(a	a)	(a	a)	
2.1.	Equal	rates	both	rates:	
2.056	
(a	b)	(a	b)	
3.1.	Uniform	rate	only	in	one	
country	equals	participation	
rate	in	the	other:	19	
(a	a)	(a	b)	
2.2.		Equal	rates	only	
participation:	4		
(a	b)	(a	c)	
3.2.	Uniform	rate	only	in	one	
country	equals	portfolio	rate	in	
the	other:	7		
(a	a)	(b	a)	
1.2.	Different	rates:	
156		
(a	a)	(b	b)	with	a≠b	 2.3.	Equal	rates	only	portfolio:	24		(a	b)	(c	b)	 3.3.	No	equal	rates:	57	(a	a)	(b	c)	
2.4.	No	equal	rates:	2	
(a	b)	(c	d)	
	
Table	1B:	Constellations	for	the	Withholding	Tax	Rates	on	Dividends	in	the	Double	Tax	
Treaties	in	1980	
1.	Uniform	rates	 2.	Split	rates	both	countries	 3.	Split	rates	one	country	
1.1.	Equal	rates:	414	
(a	a)	(a	a)	
2.1.	Equal	rates	both	rates:	
348		
(a	b)	(a	b)	
3.1.	Uniform	rate	only	in	one	
country	equals	participation	
rate	in	the	other:	21	
(a	a)	(a	b)	
2.2.		Equal	rates	only	
participation:	0	
(a	b)	(a	c)	
3.2.	Uniform	rate	only	in	one	
country	equals	portfolio	rate	in	
the	other:	5	
(a	a)	(b	a)	
1.2.	Different	rates:	
78	
(a	a)	(b	b)	with	a≠b	 2.3.	Equal	rates	only	portfolio:	10	(a	b)	(c	b)	 3.3.	No	equal	rates:	25	(a	a)	(b	c)	
2.4.	No	equal	rates:	2		
(a	b)	(c	d)	
Appendix B. Summary Statistics  
This appendix depicts the summary statistics for the estimated samples in 
Tables 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. 
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Table	2A:	Summary	Statistics	for	Tables	2,	3	and	4	
Variable	 Obs.	 Mean	 Std.	Dev.		 Min		 Max		
WHT	on	host’	portfolio	dividends		 33,310	 0.1240471	 0.0515946	 0	 0.47	
WHT	on	host’	participation	dividends		 33,310	 0.0759778	 0.0524172	 0	 0.47	
Spread	between	the	WTRs		 33,310	 0.0480694	 0.0479371	 0	 0.2	
gdp_o	 33,310	 8.88e+11	 1.96e+12	 8.47e+08	 1.62e+13	
gdp_d	 33,310	 8.76e+11	 1.94e+12	 8.47e+08	 1.62e+13	
gdpcap_o	 33,310	 24958.19	 23308.1	 162.8132	 113738.7	
gdpcap_d	 33,310	 24834.37	 23201.15	 162.8132	 113738.7	
OECD_o	 33,310	 0.4775743	 0.4983006	 0	 1	
OECD_d	 33,310	 0.4587211	 0.4995043	 0	 1	
OECD_pair	 33,310	 0.1959472	 0.396934	 0	 1	
EU_o	 33,310	 0.3666467	 0.4818961	 0	 1	
EU_d	 33,310	 0.3611828	 0.4803506	 0	 1	
EU_pair	 33,310	 0.1254278	 0.3312083	 0	 1	
taxhaven_o	 33,310	 0.1124887	 0.3159716	 0	 1	
taxhaven_d	 33,310	 0.1217352	 0.3269847	 0	 1	
taxhaven_pair	 33,310	 0.0167217	 0.1282286	 0	 1	
taxdividends_o	 33,310	 0.1411164	 0.1091825	 0	 0.55	
taxdividends_d	 33,310	 0.139616	 0.109793	 0	 0.55	
	
Table	5A:	Summary	statistics	for	Table	5	(1)		
Variable	 Obs.	 Mean	 Std.	Dev.		 Min		 Max		
split		 101,303	 0.4744381	 0.4993486	 0	 1	
target_lag	 101,303	 0.2404886	 0.271204	 0	 1	
gdp_o	 101,303	 8.04e+11	 1.50e+12	 1.26e+07	 1.62e+13	
gdp_d	 101,303	 6.04e+11	 1.50e+12	 1.26e+07	 1.62e+13	
gdpcap_o	 101,303	 16168.46	 17854.31	 47.46514	 113738.7	
gdpcap_d	 101,303	 16168.5	 17854.29	 40.46514	 113738.7	
OECD_o	 101,303	 0.5384836	 0.4985193	 0	 1	
OECD_d	 101,303	 0.5253349	 0.4993602	 0	 1	
OECD_pair	 101,303	 0.2568729	 0.4369109	 0	 1	
EU_o	 101,303	 0.3119947	 0.46331	 0	 1	
EU_d	 101,303	 0.3119947	 0.46331	 0	 1	
EU_pair	 101,303	 0.0865917	 0.2812372	 0	 1	
taxhaven_o	 101,303	 0.1096216	 0.3124191	 0	 1	
taxhaven_d	 101,303	 0.1096315	 0.3124314	 0	 1	
taxhaven_pair	 101,303	 0.0125564	 0.1113501	 0	 1	
tieas_o	 101,303	 0.9322922	 4.199315	 0	 37	
tieas_d	 101,303	 0.9322922	 4.	199315	 0	 37	
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Table	5B:	Summary	statistics	for	Table	5	(1)-(4)		
Variable	 Obs.	 Mean	 Std.	Dev.		 Min		 Max		
split		 34,396	 0.5597744	 0.4964214	 0	 1	
target_lag	 34,396	 0.3104911	 0.2947316	 0	 1	
gdp_o	 34,396	 8.79e+11	 1.96e+12	 8.47e+08	 1.62e+13	
gdp_d	 34,396	 8.79e+11	 1.96e+12	 8.47e+08	 1.62e+13	
gdpcap_o	 34,396	 24689.39	 23141.99	 162.8132	 113738.7	
gdpcap_d	 34,396	 24689.39	 23140.99	 162.8132	 113738.7	
OECD_o	 34,396	 0.4692215	 0.4990584	 0	 1	
OECD_d	 34,396	 0.4569136	 0.4981473	 0	 1	
OECD_pair	 34,396	 0.1926968	 0.3944227	 0	 1	
EU_o	 34,396	 0.3609141	 0.4802726	 0	 1	
EU_d	 34,396	 0.3609141	 0.44802726	 0	 1	
EU_pair	 34,396	 0.1243168	 0.3299474	 0	 1	
taxhaven_o	 34,396	 0.120421	 0.3254579	 0	 1	
taxhaven_d	 34,396	 0.120421	 0.	3254579	 0	 1	
taxhaven_pair	 34,396	 0.0178509	 0.1324114	 0	 1	
taxdividends_o	 34,396	 0.1390637	 0.1099107	 0	 0.55	
taxdividends_d	 34,396	 0.1390637	 0.	1099107	 0	 0.55	
tieas_o	 34,396	 2.698366	 6.843898	 0	 37	
tieas_d	 34,396	 2.698366	 6.843898	 0	 37	
	
Table	5C:	Summary	statistics	for	Table	5	(5)-(6)	
Variable	 Obs.	 Mean	 Std.	Dev.		 Min		 Max		
split		 33,676	 0.5663974	 0.4955791	 0	 1	
target_lag	 33,676	 0.3155696	 0.2947642	 0	 1	
gdp_o	 33,676	 8.85e+11	 1.98e+12	 8.47e+08	 1.62e+13	
gdp_d	 33,676	 8.85e+11	 1.98e+12	 8.47e+08	 1.62e+13	
gdpcap_o	 33,676	 24835.53	 23121.76	 162.8132	 113738.7	
gdpcap_d	 33,676	 24835.53	 23121.76	 162.8132	 113738.7	
OECD_o	 33,676	 0.4723245	 0.4992409	 0	 1	
OECD_d	 33,676	 0.4597636	 0.4983858	 0	 1	
OECD_pair	 33,676	 0.1968167	 0.3975985	 0	 1	
EU_o	 33,676	 0.3633745	 0.4809785	 0	 1	
EU_d	 33,676	 0.3633745	 0.4809785	 0	 1	
EU_pair	 33,676	 0.1269747	 0.3329496	 0	 1	
taxhaven_o	 33,676	 0.1215703	 0.3267937	 0	 1	
taxhaven_d	 33,676	 0.1215703	 0.3267937	 0	 1	
taxhaven_pair	 33,676	 0.017995	 0.132935	 0	 1	
taxdividends_o	 33,676	 0.1387755	 0.1099384	 0	 0.55	
taxdividends_d	 33,676	 0.1387755	 0.1099384	 0	 0.55	
tieas_o	 33,676	 2.707685	 6.860425	 0	 37	
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tieas_d	 33,676	 2.707685	 6.860425	 0	 37	
 
Appendix C. Robustness Checks 
The first part of the appendix reproduces Table 2, but uses another proxy for 
the extent to which countries are worried about tax avoidance and tax evasion is 
the tax morale variable from the World Values Survey (WVS, 2015) that asks the 
question: “Do you justify cheating on taxes if you have the chance”, and takes 
the values between 1 (always) and 10 (never). The hypothesis is that countries, 
whose population is more likely to cheat on their taxes, may be worried about 
tax avoidance and tax evasion, and therefore have an interest in a high tax treaty 
withholding rate on portfolio dividends in the host country. The results in Table 
2B remain unchanged and one can confirm the hypothesis that countries with 
population having a low tax morale are expected to have an interest in a high 
treaty withholding tax rate on portfolio dividends in the host country. 
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Table	2B:	Tax	Treaty	Withholding	Rates	on	Portfolio	Dividends	in	the	Host	Country	with	a	
Different	Proxy	
		
(1)	WTR	on	
host’	portfolio	
dividends	
(2)	WTR	on	
host’	portfolio	
dividends	
VARIABLES	 	 	
gdp_o	 -1.64e-16	 	
 (2.36e-16)	 	
gdp_d	 3.53e-16	 	
 (2.89e-16)	 	
gdpcap_o	 1.37e-07***	 	
 (4.70e-08)	 	
gdpcap_d	 7.60e-08	 	
 (4.72e-08)	 	
ln_gdp_o	 	 0.0137*	
	 	 (0.00744)	
ln_gdp_d	 	 -0.00875	
	 	 (0.00577)	
ln_gdpcap_o	 	 -0.0132*	
	 	 (0.00779)	
ln_gdpcap_d	 	 0.0100*	
	 	 (0.00604)	
tax_morale_o	 -2.438***	 -1.663***	
	 (0.310)	 (0.551)	
tax_morale_d	 -0.778	 -1.376*	
	 (0.684)	 (0.778)	
OECD_o	 -0.00475	 -0.00463	
	 (0.00289)	 (0.00289)	
OECD_d	 -0.00306	 -0.00311	
	 (0.00288)	 (0.00288)	
OECD_pair	 -0.00281	 -0.00281	
	 (0.00322)	 (0.00322)	
EU_o	 -0.00505**	 -0.00451**	
	 (0.00212)	 (0.00214)	
EU_d	 -0.00500**	 -0.00611***	
	 (0.00210)	 (0.00209)	
EU_pair	 0.00621*	 0.00622*	
	 (0.00355)	 (0.00355)	
taxhaven_o	 -0.795***	 -0.546***	
	 (0.0978)	 (0.176)	
taxhaven_d	 -0.265	 -0.458*	
	 (0.218)	 (0.249)	
taxhaven_pair	 0.0127	 0.0127	
	 (0.00831)	 (0.00832)	
taxdividends_o	 -0.000739	 -0.00139	
	 (0.00307)	 (0.00305)	
taxdividends_d	 0.000449	 4.74e-05	
	 (0.00360)	 (0.00357)	
Time-fixed	effects		 YES	 YES	
Home-fixed	effects	 YES	 YES	
Host-fixed	effects	 YES	 YES	
Observations	 20,773	 20,773	
R-squared	 0.468 0.468 
Note:	Robust	standards	errors	in	parentheses	are	clustered	by	country	pair	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.		
The	dependent	variable	is	the	tax	treaty	withholding	rate	on	portfolio	dividends	in	the	host	countries.		
 
The second part of the appendix reproduces Table 5. Table 5D excludes the 
target lag from the estimation in order to verify whether it drives the results for 
the coefficients on the TIEAs. Table 5E reproduces Table 5, while including only 
new treaties as separate observations. Despite the smaller sample, results 
remain unchanged.  
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Table	5D:	Spatial	Dependence	of	a	Split	in	the	Withholding	Tax	Rates	on	Dividends	
		 (1)	OLS	 (2)	OLS	 (3)	OLS	 (4)	OLS	 (5)	Probit	 (6)	Probit	
VARIABLES	
Split	in	
WTRs	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
Split	in	
WTRs	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
Split	in	
WTRs	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
Split	in	
WTRs	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
Split	in	
WTRs	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
Split	in	
WTRs	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
target_lag	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
gdp_o	 1.38e-14	 -4.80e-15	 	 	 5.57e-14**	 	
 (5.79e-15)	 (4.32e-15)	 	 	 (2.32e-14)	 	
gdp_d	 1.16e-14	 -4.91e-15	 	 	 3.46e-14*	 	
 (5.71e-15)	 (4.28e-15)	 	 	 (2.00e-14)	 	
gdpcap_o	 7.99e-07*	 -6.23e-07	 	 	 2.96e-06*	 	
 (4.10e-07)	 (5.16e-07)	 	 	 (1.63e-06)	 	
gdpcap_d	 7.79e-07*	 -8.29e-07	 	 	 3.61e-06**	 	
 (4.00e-07)	 (5.09e-07)	 	 	 (1.66e-06)	 	
LNgdp_o	 	 	 -0.123***	 -0.131*	 	 -0.4023*	
	 	 	 (0.0470)	 (0.0688)	 	 (0.1671)	
LNgdp_d	 	 	 -0.0891*	 -0.131*	 	 -0.2730	
	 	 	 (0.0481)	 (0.0703)	 	 (0.1703)	
LNgdpcap_o	 	 	 0.142***	 0.152**	 	 0.4821***	
	 	 	 (0.0489)	 (0.0666)	 	 (0.1737)	
LNgdpcap_d	 	 	 0.105**	 0.131*	 	 0.3332*	
	 	 	 (0.0502)	 (0.0681)	 	 (0.1760)	
tieas_o	 0.000969***	 0.000795*	 0.00101***	 0.000795*	 0.0039***	 0.0043***	
	 (0.000324)	 (0.000451)	 (0.000332)	 (0.000451)	 (0.0013)	 (0.0013)	
tieas_d	 0.000821***	 0.000747*	 0.000853***	 0.000747*	 0.0031***	 0.0035**	
	 (0.000303)	 (0.000421)	 (0.000310)	 (0.000421)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0012)	
OECD_o	 -0.0328	 -0.0416*	 -0.0361	 -0.0416*	 -0.1322	 -0.1400	
	 (0.0236)	 (0.0245)	 (0.0236)	 (0.0245)	 (0.0850)	 (0.0850)	
OECD_d	 -0.0300	 -0.0388	 -0.0331	 -0.0388	 -0.1213	 -0.1249	
	 (0.0244)	 (0.0252)	 (0.0244)	 (0.0252)	 (0.0870)	 (0.0862)	
OECD_pair	 -0.00934	 -0.00873	 -0.00939	 -0.00873	 -0.0449	 -0.0461	
	 (0.0341)	 (0.0342)	 (0.0341)	 (0.0342)	 (0.1284)	 (0.1272)	
EU_o	 -0.0255	 -0.0283	 -0.0456*	 -0.0283	 -0.0810	 -0.1521*	
	 (0.0241)	 (0.0253)	 (0.0244)	 (0.0253)	 (0.0798)	 (0.0806)	
EU_d	 -0.0251	 -0.0241	 -0.0416*	 -0.0241	 -0.0821	 -0.1375*	
	 (0.0243)	 (0.0254)	 (0.0246)	 (0.0254)	 (0.0764)	 (0.0771)	
EU_pair	 0.00691	 0.00667	 0.00702	 0.00667	 -0.0061	 -0.0046	
	 (0.0370)	 (0.0372)	 (0.0370)	 (0.0372)	 (0.1361)	 (0.1361)	
taxhaven_o	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -0.7869	 -0.7922	
	 -	 -	 -	 -	 (0.4991)	 (0.4996)	
taxhaven_d	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -0.6109	 -0.6129	
	 -	 -	 -	 -	 (0.4846)	 (0.4863)	
taxhaven_pair	 -0.0613	 -0.0617	 -0.0610	 -0.0617	 -0.3128	 -0.3119	
	 (0.0513)	 (0.0514)	 (0.0513)	 (0.0514)	 (0.2279)	 (0.2279)	
taxdividends_o	 0.0261	 -0.00277	 0.0198	 -0.00277	 0.0567	 0.0360	
	 (0.0284) (0.0322)	 (0.0281)	 (0.0322)	 (0.1089)	 (0.1080)	
taxdividends_d	 0.0304	 0.0100	 0.0250	 0.0100	 0.0544	 0.0354	
	 (0.0289)	 (0.0325)	 (0.0286)	 (0.0325)	 (0.1158)	 (0.1147)	
Time-fixed	effects	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Home-fixed	effects	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Host-fixed	effects	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Source-region-year	
fixed	effects	 NO	 YES	 NO	 YES	 NO	 NO	
Target-region-year	
fixed	effects	 NO	 YES	 NO	 YES	 NO	 NO	
Observations	 34,412	 34,412	 34,412	 34,412	 33,692	 33,692	
R-squared	 0.355	 0.355	 0.355	 	0.355	 		 		
Pseudo	R-squared	 	 	 	 	 0.2943	 0.2942	
Note:	Robust	standards	errors	in	parentheses	are	clustered	by	country	pair	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.		
The	dependent	variable	is	a	dummy	variable	having	the	value	of	unity	if	a	country	has	asymmetric	rates	on	dividends	in	
the	double	 tax	 treaty	with	 its	partner,	 i.e.	 it	prescribes	different	 rates	on	 the	withholding	 tax	 rates	on	portfolio	and	
participation	dividends.		
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Table	5E:	Spatial	Dependence	of	a	Split	in	the	Withholding	Tax	Rates	on	Dividends	
		 (1)	OLS	 (2)	OLS	 (3)	OLS	 (4)	OLS	 (5)	Probit	 (6)	Probit	
VARIABLES	
Split	in	
WTRs	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
Split	in	
WTRs	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
Split	in	
WTRs	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
Split	in	
WTRs	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
Split	in	
WTRs	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
Split	in	
WTRs	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
target_lag	 0.156*	 0.148*	 0.128	 0.121	 1.219**	 1.077**	
	 (0.0815)	 (0.0864)	 (0.0806)	 (0.0871)	 (0.478)	 (0.484)	
gdp_o	 4.75e-14	 -4.80e-15	 	 	 5.25e-13	 	
 (5.62e-14)	 (4.32e-15)	 	 	 (4.02e-13)	 	
gdp_d	 4.88e-14	 -4.91e-15	 	 	 2.05e-13	 	
 (5.05e-14)	 (4.28e-15)	 	 	 (2.48e-13)	 	
gdpcap_o	 -6.72e-06**	 -9.04e-06**	 	 	 -3.03e-05	 	
 (3.25e-06)	 (4.00e-06)	 	 	 (1.86e-05)	 	
gdpcap_d	 -2.14e-06	 -6.76e-06*	 	 	 -2.49e-06	 	
 (3.31e-06)	 (4.10e-06)	 	 	 (1.93e-05)	 	
LNgdp_o	 	 	 -0.242	 -0.0359	 	 -0.656	
	 	 	 (0.201)	 (0.292)	 	 (1.126)	
LNgdp_d	 	 	 -0.0903	 0.0276	 	 -0.00727	
	 	 	 (0.216)	 (0.303)	 	 (1.146)	
LNgdpcap_o	 	 	 0.362*	 0.177	 	 2.022*	
	 	 	 (0.203)	 (0.267)	 	 (1.070)	
LNgdpcap_d	 	 	 0.237	 0.0922	 	 1.397	
	 	 	 (0.217)	 (0.279)	 	 (1.051)	
tieas_o	 -0.00180	 -0.00286	 -0.000943	 -0.00287	 -0.0297	 -0.00671	
	 (0.00304)	 (0.00568)	 (0.00305)	 (0.00558)	 (0.0224)	 (0.0233)	
tieas_d	 -0.00237	 -0.00129	 -0.00135	 -0.00156	 -0.0344	 -0.0106	
	 (0.00306)	 (0.00570)	 (0.00307)	 (0.00554)	 (0.0254)	 (0.0265)	
OECD_o	 -0.212*	 -0.220	 -0.236*	 -0.214	 -1.151	 -1.193*	
	 (0.126)	 (0.171)	 (0.127)	 (0.168)	 (0.711)	 (0.702)	
OECD_d	 -0.191	 -0.156	 -0.206	 -0.145	 -1.184*	 -1.181*	
	 (0.131)	 (0.163)	 (0.131)	 (0.161)	 (0.659)	 (0.657)	
OECD_pair	 -0.209***	 -0.165*	 -0.214***	 -0.164*	 -1.436**	 -1.415**	
	 (0.0804)	 (0.0885)	 (0.0808)	 (0.0896)	 (0.612)	 (0.616)	
EU_o	 -0.0385	 0.194	 -0.0887	 0.173	 2.056**	 1.570*	
	 (0.188)	 (0.252)	 (0.193)	 (0.247)	 (0.900)	 (0.937)	
EU_d	 0.00816	 0.245	 -0.0520	 0.216	 2.124**	 1.706*	
	 (0.194)	 (0.263)	 (0.203)	 (0.259)	 (0.936)	 (0.956)	
EU_pair	 0.0798	 0.0737	 0.0837	 0.0920	 1.264**	 1.280**	
	 (0.0950)	 (0.0998)	 (0.0943)	 (0.0989)	 (0.635)	 (0.652)	
taxhaven_o	 -	 -	 -	 -	 0.134	 -1.289	
	 -	 -	 -	 -	 (0.823)	 (0.990)	
taxhaven_d	 -	 -	 -	 -	 0.794	 -0.615	
	 -	 -	 -	 -	 (1.012)	 (1.141)	
taxhaven_pair	 -0.133	 -0.135	 -0.140	 -0.145	 -1.347**	 -1.400**	
	 (0.0964)	 (0.113)	 (0.0961)	 (0.116)	 (0.543)	 (0.553)	
taxdividends_o	 -0.0223	 -0.590	 -0.0311	 -0.549	 0.510	 -0.146	
	 (0.516)	 (0.599)	 (0.515)	 (0.590)	 (2.895)	 (2.870)	
taxdividends_d	 0.00170	 -0.508	 -0.0661	 -0.508	 0.776	 0.477	
	 (0.519)	 (0.611)	 (0.517)	 (0.600)	 (2.920)	 (2.898)	
Time-fixed	effects	 YES YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Home-fixed	effects	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Host-fixed	effects	 YES YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Source-region-year	
fixed	effects	 NO YES NO YES NO NO 
Target-region-year	
fixed	effects	 NO	 YES	 NO	 YES	 NO	 NO	
Observations	 1,118	 1,086	 1,118	 1,086	 811	 811	
R-squared	 0.552	 0.688	 0.552	 0.686	 	 	
Pseudo	R-squared		 	 	 	 0.1836	 0.474	 0.474	
Note:	Robust	standards	errors	in	parentheses	are	clustered	by	country	pair	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.		
The	dependent	variable	 is	a	dummy	variable	having	the	value	of	unity	 if	a	country	has	asymmetric	rates	on	dividends	 in	the	
double	tax	treaty	with	its	partner,	i.e.	it	prescribes	different	rates	on	the	withholding	tax	rates	on	portfolio	and	participation	
dividends.		
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The last part of the appendix and Table 6D reproduces Table 6, but includes 
only new treaties as separate observations. Despite the smaller sample, results 
remain unchanged.  
 
Table	6D:	Spatial	Dependence	of	a	Spread	in	the	Withholding	Tax	Rates	on	Dividends	
		
(1)	Spread	of	
WTRs	on		
Partner’s	
dividends	
(2)	Spread	on	
WTRs	on		
partner’s	
dividends	
(3)	Spread	of	
WTRs	on	
partner’s		
dividends	
(4)	Spread	of	
WTRs	on	
partner’s	
dividends	
VARIABLES	
	
	 	 	 	
target_lag	 0.132**	 0.0422	 0.126**	 0.0523	
	 (0.0569)	 (0.0586)	 (0.0570)	 (0.0596)	
gdp_o	 -6.43e-15	 -1.78e-14**	 	 	
 (5.26e-15)	 (6.91e-15)	 	 	
gdp_d	 2.56e-16	 -1.63e-14*	 	 	
 (5.40e-15)	 (9.21e-15)	 	 	
gdpcap_o	 -2.97e-07	 -1.18e-06**	 	 	
 (3.39e-07)	 (4.76e-07)	 	 	
gdpcap_d	 1.16e-07	 -9.37e-08	 	 	
 (3.16e-07)	 (4.32e-07)	 	 	
LNgdp_o	 	 	 -0.00676	 -0.0108	
	 	 	 (0.0227)	 (0.0313)	
LNgdp_d	 	 	 -0.00336	 -0.000968	
	 	 	 (0.0203)	 (0.0293)	
LNgdpcap_o	 	 	 0.00196	 -0.0156	
	 	 	 (0.0215)	 (0.0289)	
LNgdpcap_d	 	 	 0.0121	 -0.00811	
	 	 	 (0.0205)	 (0.0275)	
tieas_o	 -5.76e-05	 0.000173	 -7.88e-05	 -0.000178	
	 (0.000398)	 (0.000637)	 (0.000407)	 (0.000627)	
tieas_d	 -0.000227	 -0.000368	 -0.000237	 -0.000551	
	 (0.000388)	 (0.000630)	 (0.000395)	 (0.000636)	
OECD_o	 -0.0224**	 -0.0130	 -0.0227**	 -0.0153	
	 (0.0112)	 (0.0157)	 (0.0113)	 (0.0153)	
OECD_d	 -0.0142	 -0.0239	 -0.0133	 -0.0192	
	 (0.0131)	 (0.0168)	 (0.0133)	 (0.0168)	
OECD_pair	 -0.00754	 -0.00424	 -0.00709	 -0.00250	
	 (0.00887)	 (0.00906)	 (0.00885)	 (0.00912)	
EU_o	 -0.0115	 -0.0130	 -0.0108	 -0.0124	
	 (0.0180)	 (0.0211)	 (0.0180)	 (0.0209)	
EU_d	 -0.0271	 -0.0299	 -0.0296	 -0.0291	
	 (0.0217)	 (0.0254)	 (0.0219)	 (0.0257)	
EU_pair	 0.0118	 0.00693	 0.0122	 0.00859	
	 (0.00968)	 (0.0104)	 (0.00966)	 (0.0102)	
taxhaven_o	 -	 -	 -	 -	
	 -	 -	 -	 -	
taxhaven_d	 -	 -	 -	 -	
	 -	 -	 -	 -	
taxhaven_pair	 0.00455	 -0.00254	 0.00413	 -0.00578	
	 (0.00980)	 (0.0106)	 (0.00987)	 (0.0106)	
taxdividends_o	 0.0375	 -0.0183	 0.0420	 -0.00239	
	 (0.0624)	 (0.0744)	 (0.0629)	 (0.0739)	
taxdividends_d	 -0.0126	 0.0278	 -0.0102	 0.0262	
	 (0.0672)	 (0.0810)	 (0.0673)	 (0.0824)	
	 	 	 	 	
Time-fixed	effects	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Home-fixed	effects	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Host-fixed	effects	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Source-region-year	fixed	
effects	 NO	 YES	 NO	 YES	
Target-region-year	fixed	
effects	 NO YES	 NO	 YES	
Observations	 879	 837	 879	 837	
R-squared	 0.626 0.748	 0.625	 0.742	
Note:	Robust	standards	errors	in	parentheses	are	clustered	by	country	pair	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.		
The	dependent	variable	is	the	spread	between	the	tax	treaty	withholding	rate	on	portfolio	and	participation	
dividends	in	the	host	countries.	
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